LBA Chariot Warfare

(Essay orignally posted in a Usenet newsgroup in 1999)

(All material copyrighted)

Part 1

Two interesting sources of information on Late Bronze Age (LBA) chariot warfare are the Amarna Letters and the Seven Military Classics of ancient China. Both of these sources, in their own ways, give insight (or at least speculation) into chariot warfare. I thought I'd explore some of the things I've run across. This is not a complete picture of chariot use, just some thoughts inspired by these works.

(All Amarna letter translations are from William Moran, "The Amarna Letters" (1992). All of the Military Classics translations are from Ralph D. Sawyer "The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China" (1993). I have occasionally made minor editorial changes to the translations for the sake of clarity. These changes in no way modify the author's intended understanding. They are set off by { } )

First, the Amarna letters. In particular, the letters from Rib-Ḫadda of Byblos to the pharaoh. Rib-Ḫadda's favorite thing to do, besides complain about his Amurrite neighbors, was to request Egyptian military aid against those Amurrite neighbors (Ok, he kinda had a one track mind). But what he requests is interesting. In the Hittite sources, a fairly common, generic way of expressing the army as a whole was to speak of the infantry and "horses", i.e. chariotry. Rib-Ḫadda also requests infantry and chariotry, but it's interesting that he seems to most strongly desire archers. In fact, in one letter we read the following,

"So send me 50 pairs of horses and 200 infantry that I may resist him in {the city} Šigata until the coming forth of the archers." (EA #71)

(As an aside: The ratio of chariotry to infantry in this letter (1:4) is extremely high. Generally, a good "rule of thumb" is somewhere around 1:20. The ratio in Syria is higher, almost certainly due to the nature of the Syrian terrain.)

It seems that here Rib-Ḫadda sees the combined infantry and chariotry as nothing more than a stop-gap measure until the archers could arrive! In fact, this impression carries through strongly in most of his letters. This certainly suggests that the chariotry army was not as omnipotent as many sources would lead us to believe. Or at least, it suggests a definite limit to its role in warfare. One might at first suppose that the infantry and chariotry could be viewed as an "expeditionary" army, while the archers' primary role was defensive, but the letters don't support such a distinction, e.g.,

"May he grant 400 men and 30 pairs of horses, as were given to {Mr.} Šurata, that they may guard the city for you." (EA #85) (ratio: ~ 1:13)

"Send a large force of archers that it may drive out the king's enemies and all lands be joined to the king." (EA #76)

In fact, in many cases (although it is not always clear) the infantry and chariotry seem to be requested for defensive purposes until archers could come out and drive the enemy from the land. Even this, though, is misleading, since infantry and chariotry were clearly offensive as well, e.g.,

"Then he {i.e. �Abdi-Aširta} heard that there were no troops with him {i.e. a Byblite messenger returning from Egypt}, and as a result {the Byblite city} Batruna was join[ed] to him. He has stationed the �Apiru and chariots there, and they have not moved [f]rom the entrance of the gate of Gub<la>. [Loo]k, urge the king, my lord, with loud cries! Let an elite force, [together with] chariots, [advan]ce with you that I may . . . [. . . the �Apir]u from it (the gate)." (EA #87)

"Moreover, may it seem rig<h>t to my lord, and may he send 20 pairs of first-class horses to his servant - there are many men on my side - so that I can march against the enemies of the king, my lord." (EA #106)

The passage from EA #87 is particularly useful in that we see chariots being used (or at least desired) for both the attack on and the defense of a city. The impression one is left with is that, in terms of its defensive role, it is probably the situation that chariotry was useful as a "proactive" defense, sallying forth from the gates to attack an invading army. Consider the following passages from the Chinese classic "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings", Chap. 40, "In general, when attacking cities and beseiging towns, the chariots and cavalry must be kept at a distance," and, in describing a hypothetical situation when beseiging a town, "Some of their chariots, cavalry, and elite troops assault us from within; others attack from without." I further believe this complies tolarantly well with the situation in the Iliad, where the Greeks did not try to encamp up against or even near the city walls, but left a large open space between them and the walls where most of the fighting was expected to take place. This open space certainly served to give the attacking army some time to get their act together and respond to any surprise attack from the town.

Another way chariots were deployed in the the defense of a city was going on patrol in order to scout out and intercept any encroaching force, as seems to be the case in the following letter,

"I have obeyed the orders of the king, my lord and my Sun, and I am indeed guard[ing] Magidda, the city of the king, my lord, day and night. By day I guard (it) [f]rom the fields with chariots, and by n[ight] on the wall[s of] the king, my lord. And as the warring of the �A[pi]ru in the land is seve[re], may the king, my lord, take cognizance of his land." (EA #243)

Compare this with a passage from the Hittite "Seige of Uršu" text, where the Hittite king, who is beseiging the city Uršu, has to repeatedly teach his incompetent officers how to do their jobs (These lessons, and the portrayal of the king as the fount of wisdom, seem to be the purpose of this text),

"The king became angry and said: �Guard the roads - keep watch on those who would enter the city and those who would go out of the city! Let no (one) go over to the (other) enemies - to the city Zaruar, to the city Aleppo, to the Hurrian army, or to Zuppa!' They replied: �We will be on guard. Eighty chariots (and) eight armies encircle the city. May the heart of the king not be troubled. I am in place!" (trans. Beckman, JCS 47 (1995) 26f.)

In terms of chariot use for scouting, compare EA #243 above with the following excerpts from the Hittite "Instruction Text for the Lords of the Towers", from a description of the daily procedures for keeping a walled border town well protected,

"May the scouts take the tower of the long road, and may the [. . .]-men drive down from the town to the perimeter for sweeping (with their eyes). From there may they sweep the perimeter (with their eyes) carefully just so!" (i 12-14)

"What troops hold the towers, may they protect (them). Further, may they cover the roads carefully, and may they observe the enemy traces." (i 35-36)

Further, at the end of each day, the day scouts would retreat back behind the city walls, driving the field workers and animals up into the city before them (the reverse took place in the morning; first the scouts, then the people). Then, once the gates were secured, troops would be positioned and a night watch would begin from the gates. This picture obviously closely conforms with what the Amarna letter describes. But the Hittite text also mentions that there were troops who would stay outside the city walls for two days, and also that if any enemy attacked, they were to be pursued for three days, and then the roads held for two. Whether something similar held true in Syria-Palestine I don't know.

So, when a town was not being attacked, chariots would be used by the defenders of the town to patrol the roads. If it fell under seige, it was now the role of the attackers to patrol the roads, to prevent anyone from leaving, or to intercept anyone who might be trying to come to the town's assistance.

The use of chariots for scouting is also suggested in the Hittite text by the fact that each road was to be held by two scouts. The normal complement for a chariot was two men (Although that this is indeed what is implied must remain uncertain). This impression is further strengthened (but, again, not proven) by the fact that, before the Battle of Kadesh, Rameses captured the Hittite scouts in pairs (shown being beaten in, e.g. the Luxor and Ramesseum reliefs).

I really can't clarify the different situations which would motivate the varying requests for archers vs. infantry and chariotry in the Amarna texts. All I can say is that Rib-Ḫadda and other Palestinian mayors definitely seem to being holding out hope for the arrival of *archers* as the ultimate solution to their problems. In fact, when �Abdi-Aširta was finally killed, Rib-Ḫadda credited it to the arrival of Egyptian archers (although it might be more realistic to simply credit it to the arrival of an Egyptian "force" or "prescence", regardless of its composition.).

Part 2

As for the Chinese stuff. I am a huge fan of historical analogy. I am always looking for repeated historical patterns from one region/time as support for murky evidence in my period of interest. So when it finally clicked in my head that Sun Tzu's Art of War was written at a time when chariots were in use in China, I thought, what a great way to try to get at how Near Eastern chariots were used in war, since there are no comparable works from the Near East. This led to my "discovery" that there were six more Chinese military classics besides Sun Tzu. This greatly tickled my analogy bone, and so I've been reading the lot of them. In doing so, I've now learned that there are a lot of other works out there to seek out analogies in, but for now I'll go with what I've got.

The Seven Military Classics of China help to more clearly define the limits within which chariots were useful, and also how they should be strategically and tactically employed. At least a few of the classics, even though their current recensions date to many centuries after the LBA, nonetheless contain concepts originated early in the era of chariot warfare in China, and so should certainly be investigated for parallels. In fact, there are parallels, and some pretty strong ones.

The least important parallel here, and by far the least certain (I throw it in just as a "suspicious coincidence"), has to do with the number of men forming a chariot crew. In the Hittite army at the Battle of Kadesh, we find for the first time a chariot crew consisting of three men. Rameses made a big deal about this. Two things should be noted here: first, in the artistic depictions of the battle, not all Hittite chariot crews contain three men. We should not assume that all Hittite chariots contained three men at this battle. The Hittite army had large contingents of vassal forces, and we should not assume homogeneity. Anyway, the second point is that the Battle of Kadesh took place in the mid-13^th century. Interestingly, sometime in or by the 13^th century is also when the introduction of the chariot is dated in China, and the Chinese chariots could also hold three men crews. Chariots were clearly not independent inventions in China, but rather introduced from foreign parts. The three man crew is usually seen as a Hittite innovation in the Near East. However, given the apparent near contemporaneity of these two events, it might be possible to postulate a common central Asian source for both.

I would say the single most important of the military classics for understanding the employment of chariotry is "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings", which yields two extremely important chapters on chariotry, one on when to use or not use chariots, and one on chariot formation in an attack, both to be found in the 6^th Secret Teaching, "Canine Secret Teaching".

From Chap. 58. "Battle Chariots"

In general, in chariot battles there are ten types of terrain on which death is likely and eight on which victory can be achieved.

King Wu asked: "What are the ten fatal terrains like?"

The T'ai Kung replied: "If after advancing there is no way to withdraw, this is fatal terrain which will exhaust the chariots.

"Passing beyond narrow defiles to pursue the enemy some distance, this is terrain which will exhaust the chariots.

"When the land in front makes advancing easy, while that to the rear is treacherous, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.

"Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which escape will be difficult, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.

"If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to everything, this is terrain which will labor the chariots.

"To the left is precipitous while to the right is easy, with high mounds and sharp hills. This is terrain contrary to [the use of] chariots.

"Luxuriant grass runs through the fields, and there are deep, watery channels throughout. This is terrain which thwarts [the use] of chariots.

"When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and one is not confronted by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be defeated.

"To the rear are water-filled ravines and ditches, to the left deep water, and to the right steep hills. This is terrain on which chariots are destroyed.

"It has been raining day and night for more than ten days without stopping. The roads have collapsed so that it's not possible to advance or to escape to the rear. This is terrain which will sink the chariots.

"These ten are deadly terrain for chariots. Thus they are the means by which the stupid general will be captured and the wise general will be able to escape."

King Wu asked: "What about the eight conditions of terrain that result in victory?"

The T'ai Kung replied: "When the enemy's ranks - front and rear - are not yet settled, strike into them.

"When their flags and pennants are in chaos, their men and horses frequently shifting about, then strike into them.

"When some of their officers and troops advance while others retreat; when some move to the left, others to the right, then strike into them.

"When their battle array is not yet solid, while their officers and troops are looking around at each other, then strike into them.

"When in advancing they appear full of doubt, and in withdrawing they are fearful, strike into them.

"When the enemy's Three Armies are suddenly frightened, all of them rising up in great confusion, strike into them.

"When you are fighting on easy terrain and twilight has come without being able to disengage from the battle, then strike into them.

"When, after travelling far, at dusk they are encamping and their Three Armies are terrified, strike into them.

"These eight constitute conditions in which the chariots will be victorious."

The first thing to note is that, while all the ten terrains on which chariots can be defeated actually are terrains, none of the eight terrains on which chariots can be victorious are terrains. All the eight victorious "terrains" rather deal with catching the enemy out of order. In the military classics, the importance of surprise, and catching your enemy out of formation, is repeatedly emphasized.

In terms of bad terrains, there are a couple of clear themes. 1) The chariots must be able to retreat. To be able to advance but not retreat will result in disaster. 2) Difficult terrain, particularly muddy or watery terrain, will hinder the movement of chariots and make them vulnerable.

Although not emphasized here, another clear problem of difficult terrain is that, beyond merely hindering their movement, it could result in the breaking down of the chariots themselves. The "Tso chuan" claimed that they were constantly breaking down due to broken axles, getting mired, getting tangled in branches, and falling into unseen gullies (Sawyer pg. 365f.). More than one scholar has suggested that this situation seems to be reflected in the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, where we have inventories dealing with chariots. More often than not, the inventories deal with chariot parts rather than complete chariots. While we know that chariots were disassembled before being stored, and other listed components were certainly part of an "assembly line", going towards new chariots, at least some of these chariot parts were certainly replacement parts. We have some positive evidence of this situation from the Hittite texts. In HBM #60, one of the letters from Maşat Hüyük, we read, "He also spoke in the following way to me: 'Mr. UDU-Šiwali harnessed a chariot. He then broke it.' Therefore, may he repair the chariot for him."

The importance of ambush is repeatedly mentioned in the classics. A common bit of advice is to hide your army, particularly your chariotry/cavalry, behind tall grasses, wait for the enemy to pass, and then attack him. As quoted above, catching your enemy out of formation is also emphasized. One good place to catch him out of order is when crossing water. If anyone had any doubt that Near Eastern LBA generals knew the ins and outs of such strategy, then they need only consider the Battle of Kadesh. Muwattalli began by hiding his army behind "Old Kadesh". He then waited until Rameses' army was crossing a river. He then sent out his chariots and attacked the exposed enemy. The Egyptian army reacted exactly as he would have wanted: it was terrrified and all order broke down, and they fled. Fortunately for the Hittites, they fled into Rameses' camp, creating terror and disorder there, and the Hittites experienced further success. Unfortunately, at that point, the Hittites' own order broke down, and this, along with the arrival of the troops from Amurru, enabled Rameses to salvage the situation.

Note that there is no grand face-to-face, beat-your-chest and rattle-your-sword engagement here. Such a battle did take place the next day - and neither side got anywhere. Another theme in the classics is that you do not attack a well disciplined army. The key to successful chariot warfare was to catch your enemy off guard and scare the heebie-geebies out of him. This fits rather nicely with what little we know about Hittite strategy, where such things as night attacks were favored, and of course the Kadesh evidence is pretty clear on this point.

Its worth noting that at Kadesh the Hittites beautifully embodied another of the principles that comes through in the Chinese military classics. The importance of scouting to get real information and spread misinformation is touched on in more than one classic. At Kadesh, we see Muwattalli both spreading misinformation (making Rameses believe he was still at Aleppo) and gathering real information through the use of his scouts.

We may not have any great military philosophical works from the Near East, but its perfectly clear that the generals there were familiar with such concepts and employed them.

What about tactics? How were chariots actually employed? Melee? Formation? The classics provide clues here too. Here are a couple,

"In general, the chariots realize security through close formations," (Methods of the Ssu-ma)

"If dust rises high up in a sharply defined column, chariots are coming. If it is low and broad, the infantry is advancing." (Sun-Tzu's Art of War) (This may not have held true in the LBA Near East.)

But, again, the clearest picture comes from the Six Secret Teachings,

From Chap. 55. Equivalent Forces

The T'ai Kung said: "For the chariots - a leader for five chariots, a captain for fifteen, a commander for fifty, and a general for one hundred.

"For battle on easy terrain five chariots comprise one line. The lines are forty paces apart, the chariots from left to right ten paces apart, with detachments sixty paces apart.. On difficult terrain the chariots must follow the roads, with ten comprising a company and twenty a regiment. Front to rear spacing should be twenty paces, left to right six paces, with detachments thirty-six paces apart. For five chariots there is one leader. If they venture off the road more than a li in any direction, they should return to the original road.

The chapter then continues with cavalry formations. The passage which corresponds with how far chariots can leave the road reads, "[In action] they should not range more than one hundred paces, after which they should circle back and return to their original positions."

It looks like each line would advance, attacking, and then each chariot pivot around its own axis, then the whole line would head off to the left or right in order to circle back, while the line behind began its own attack.

This type of formation may be indicated in the Karnak(?) reliefs of Kadesh, which show a line of Hittite chariots getting slaughtered by a line of Egyptian chariots behind the pharaoh. An Egyptian line is shown wiping out Hittite chariotry in the Luxor reliefs as well. All the reliefs show something else: Hittite chariots outflanking the Egyptian camp. There are neat columns of Hittite chariots shown above and below the pharaoh and his camp (i.e. left and right), and usually further Hittite chariots to the pharaoh's rear. The best interpretation of all the evidence is that, in those places where the Hittite chariots are not in formation, this should not be seen as evidence of melee tactics, but rather seen as the slaughter of the Hittite army by the Egyptians. Such a theme of the pharaoh conquering over disorder/chaos is of great antiquity in Egypt.

Another theme discussed in the Six Secret Teachings is the description of the ideal charioteer,

From Chap. 56. Martial Chariot Warriors

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: "How does one select warriors for the chariots?"

The T'ai Kung said: "The rule for selecting warriors for the chariots is to pick men under forty years of age, seven feet five inches {5 feet 7 inches in modern terms} or taller, whose running ability is such that they can pursue a galloping horse, race up to it, mount it, and ride it forward and back, left and right, up and down, all around. They should be able to quickly furl up the flags and pennants and have the strength to fully draw an eight-picul crossbow. They should practice shooting front and back, left and right, until thoroughly skilled. They are termed �Martial Chariot Warriors.' You cannot but be generous to them."

Note them importance of a chariot warrior's ability to run, ride, and shoot in any direction. This can be compared with what the Hittites had to say about the training of chariot fighters,

"The king took Mr. Išpudašinara. Mr. Šuppiuman and Mr. Marašša were Chiefs of 1,000 Chariot Fighters. He made him into their uralla -man(*). He continually runs maneuvers(?) at night. They found mistakes. Because they made a high barber's stool for Mr. Šuppiuman and Mr. Marašša, they sit the one before his ubati-troop (i.e. garrison troops?), and they sit the other before <his> ubati-troop(?).

"They will keep calling out in the night, because he put their young Chariot Fighters on the horses. Mr. Išpudašinara will teach them (about) the arrow, the sharpening wheel, and the holding of a weapon. He trained those, and he trained this one. The father of the king gave some to Mr. Nakkilit, the Chief of the Cupbearers, he gave some to Mr. Ḫuzzi, the Chief of the Heralds, and he gave some to Mr. Kizzui, the Chief of the Royal Bodyguard. They made them expert (in their fields).

"Whenever they shoot before the king, he who hits the mark, to him they give wine to drink. They [. . .] the king. He who does not hit the mark, to him they give a bitter(?) cup. There he runs the review naked." (Palace Chronicles, paragraphs 4-6)

(*) uralla-man. Beal translates this as "training sergent" or "trainer/instructor". It is based on context. His authority vis-a-vis Šuppiuman and Marašša remains ambiguous.

Here, too, the importance of shooting ability comes through clearly. I would suggest that, as a chariot line attacked, turned, and retreated, the fighters would be expected to be able to shoot at the enemy for the entire duration within which they were in range - no matter the direction of the chariot.

Elsewhere (I can't find the exact reference right now, I'm afraid) one of the classics mentions that cavalry should be used in pursuit of fleeing enemies for a certain distance. Chariots could also be used for this purpose, but they should not pursue very far, as the horses would be quickly tired by the pursuit. Since the cavalry was the military development that eventually replaced the chariotry, I think it's safe to say that, before the invention of the cavalry, chariots would also be used in pursuit of fleeing enemies. The mention that such pursuit tired the horses probably indicates that the tactic of "flee then turn and attack", so popular with, say, the Turks, didn't play a significant role in chariot warfare. The chapter quoted above on the types of deadly terrain also mentions the danger of pursuing an enemy too far.

One final quick note, regarding Drew's idea that chariot warfare was no longer effective after the LBA. This just doesn't ring true. He himself has to make excuses for several Iron Age chariot battles. In fact, its worth remembering that Rameses III defeated the Sea Peoples using a chariotry army. As for the "disappearance" of the chariot in Greece, its worth remembering that after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization, Greece seems to have become a greatly impoverished and politically divided region, regardless of a brief and partial LH IIIC "recovery". The rise of the importance of infantry based armies there may have had more to do with a lack of funds and perhaps the rise of clan polities than with anything else. Its demise in the east was much slower, and should be connected first and foremost with the development of cavalry.